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Abstract
We provide evidence of a drastic drop in stock run-ups of
U.S. target firms preceding merger and acquisition (M&A)
announcements over the past decades. The median target
run-up declines from approximately 10% in the 1980s to
2% after 2010. The trend in target run-ups cannot be fully
explained by deal or firm characteristics associated with
deal anticipation. However, it disappears after controlling
for changes in the strength of U.S. insider trading regulation
over the research period. Further analyses corroborate our
conclusion that more stringent insider trading regulation
is the most likely explanation for the reduction in target
run-ups.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is well established in the corporate finance literature that target firm stock prices tend to increase substantially
beforemerger and acquisition (M&A) announcements (Weston,Mitchell, &Mulherin, 2014). Studies on this topic con-
sistently find positive average preannouncement target abnormal stock returns (i.e., target run-ups) in the area of 10%
representing approximately half of the totalM&Astock price effect for target firms (Dennis&McConnell, 1986;Dodd,
1980; Keown& Pinkerton, 1981;Meulbroek, 1992; Schwert, 1996).
In this paper,we find thatU.S. target run-upshavebeendeclining steadily and significantly since the researchperiod
covered bymost previous studies on this topic.Whilewe observe run-ups similar inmagnitude to other studies for the
early 1980s, themedian target run-up over the final years covered by our study, 2010–2018, is only 2.18%.We further
report a significant increase in target abnormal stock returns around deal announcement dates. Total (preannounce-
ment plus announcement) stock price effects ofM&A deals for target firms do not change significantly over time.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits
use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or
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We examine whether the decrease in target run-ups can be attributed to changes in deal and firm characteristics
associated with the degree to which market participants can anticipate mergers as per the “deal anticipation” expla-
nation for target run-ups (Asquith, 1983; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). We find that the negative trend in target run-ups
persistswhenwe split deals in subsamples according to deal anticipation proxies suggested by the literature (Ambrose
&Megginson, 1992; Espahbodi&Espahbodi, 2003; Jarrell&Poulsen, 1989;Karpoff, Schonlau,&Wehrly, 2017;Palepu,
1986). This trend is not driven by a higher occurrence of deals without predeal rumors, deals without prebid toehold
stakes in recent years, or deals with single bidders. Similarly, the negative trend holds across targets with high and low
market-to-book ratios and across large and small targets. Regressions of target run-ups consistently demonstrate a
negative time trend, evenwhen including awide rangeof deal anticipation proxies.Moreover, predicted target run-ups
generated by a regression model with deal- and firm-specific independent variables systematically fail to completely
capture the decrease in actual run-ups.
We subsequently examinewhether the negative trend in target run-ups can be attributed to the increasingly strin-
gent insider trading regulations adopted in theUnited States over the researchwindow. These rules could have curbed
insiders’ potential to perform illegal trades based on knowledge of upcoming deals (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981; Meul-
broek, 1992). We focus on four important changes in insider trading regulations over the research period (i.e., IT
events). We find that after controlling for the adoption of these regulatory changes, the time trend in the run-ups
is no longer significant.
We conduct several tests to verify that the observed link between insider trading regulations and target run-ups is
not spurious. First, we zoom in on a smaller sample of deals announced immediately prior to and following the four IT
events. The median preannouncement target run-up for deals announced during the 180-day period prior to the first
IT event is 11.61%. The median target run-up falls to 8.36% for deals announced shortly after the enactment of that
first regulation. Similarly, median target run-ups around the second IT event decline from 5.81% to 4.49% and around
the third IT event from 3.71% to 1.52%. We observe median target run-ups of only 0.90% shortly after the fourth IT
event.
In addition, we exploit cross-sectional differences in the probability of insider trading. We find that the negative
impact of insider trading rules on target run-ups is stronger for deals with a larger number of target advisors. This
finding is consistent with these deals having a higher probability of provoking preannouncement insider trading (Dai,
Massoud,Nandy, & Saunders, 2017) and is not easily explained by any omitted unobservable force unrelated to insider
trading.
Moreover, we examine target shareholders’ posterior probability of informed trading on positive information
(PINgood) before merger announcements, based on observed buying transactions, as in Brennan, Huh, and Subrah-
manyam (2018).We find a declining trend in premerger PINgood values over our researchwindow.We then determine
that the negative trend in premerger PINgood values disappears when controlling for changes in insider trading reg-
ulation over the research period, consistent with increased regulation being successful at curbing premerger insider
trading.
We also conduct a placebo test on a sample of M&A deals for Canadian firms that are subject to much less strin-
gent insider trading rules than their U.S. counterparts (Bris, 2005). We find that U.S. insider trading regulations do
not reduce target run-ups for these foreign deals suggesting that the observed relation between the timing of these
regulations and the trend in U.S. target run-ups is not driven by omittedmacroeconomic variables.
Our paper is relevant for corporate managers by providing new insight that the prevailing assumptions regarding
the magnitude of target run-ups, based on older empirical studies, needs to be revised. Target run-ups have substan-
tially declined over time, and our study analyzes potential explanations for this observed phenomenon. Our findings
mayalso beuseful for policymakers and regulators by suggesting thatmore stringent insider trading rules have curbed
premerger target run-ups.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 positions our work within the literature and outlines
its contributions. Section 3 describes the sample construction andmeasurement of the target run-ups and documents
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the trend in run-ups over our sample period. Section 4 explores potential explanations for this trend. Section 5 dis-
cusses additional analyses, while Section 6 provides our conclusions.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature proposes two non–mutually exclusive explanations for target run-ups. The deal anticipation hypothesis
argues that these run-ups are driven by legal trading by informed market participants, such as proprietary traders
and risk arbitrageurs, who expect that certain firms will be the target of an upcoming deal (Jensen & Ruback, 1983).
Market participants’ expectations regarding upcoming dealsmay be based on information in press releases, mandated
disclosures, comments by “shark watchers,” and observations of activity bymerger arbitrageurs (Jabbour, Jalilvand, &
Switzer, 2000).
The “insider trading” hypothesis, in turn, argues that target run-ups are caused by illegal trading from corporate
insiders who know about the upcomingM&A deal ahead of the rest of the market (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981). Insider
trading is restricted by Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3
thereunder. According to court interpretations of these rules, there are four essential requirements for trades to qual-
ify as illegal insider trading (Netter, Poulsen, & Hersch, 1988). First, the trade must be done by a corporate insider. In
addition, the insider must trade on material inside information. Information is material if there is a substantial like-
lihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in their investment decision (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989).
Moreover, the transactionmust involve a purchase or sale of a security. Finally, theremust be evidence of an intention
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Although media sources regularly report about penalties given for high profile-
insider trading offenses, academic studies find that insider trading often goes unpunished (Bhattacharya & Daouk,
2002; Bris, 2005). Schwert (1996) argues that merger announcements are particularly challenging for regulatory
authorities trying to curb illegal trading practices. The reasons are twofold. First, mergers typically involve significant
price-sensitive information increasing potential profits associatedwith illegal trading. In addition,M&Aplanning tends
to involve awide circle of people (e.g., lawyers, consultants, target firmemployees, and regulators), all ofwhompossess
material inside information. Thus, target run-ups could be caused by illegal insider trading.
Empirical evidence for the two above explanations for target run-ups is mixed and inconclusive. Early studies pri-
marily focus on testing one of the two explanations. Consistent with the deal anticipation hypothesis, Jarrell and
Poulsen (1989) find that target run-ups and trading volumes before tender offer announcements are associated with
several observable and legal factors, such as the presence ofmedia rumors about an impending bid. Jarrell andPoulsen
(1989, p. 226) conclude that “to argue that pre-bid run-ups necessarily reflect insider trading (. . . ) is a misrepresenta-
tion of the data.” Also in line with the deal anticipation hypothesis, Gupta and Misra (1989) find that stock price run-
ups for firmsmentioned in the news as potentialM&A targets are larger than those for “no news” firms. However, they
acknowledge that they cannot completely rule out insider trading as a potential explanation for target run-ups. Betton,
Eckbo, Thompson, and Thorburn’s (2014) large sample analysis supports rational deal anticipation as a driver of target
run-ups, while rejecting a costly feedback loop from run-ups to offer prices.
Consistentwith an insider tradingexplanation for run-ups,KeownandPinkerton (1981, p. 855) allege that “impend-
ing merger announcements are poorly held secrets, and trading on this non-public information abounds.” They do
not formally test whether corporate insiders effectively cause preannouncement trading. Meulbroek (1992) makes
headway on this question by using Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) data on illegal insider trading. She finds
that almost half of the target run-up tends to occur on days with insider trading. Chakravarty and McConnell (1999),
however, determine that the effect of insiders on stock prices is not significantly different from that of noninsiders
and argue that studies should jointly examine insider and noninsider transactions. Brennan et al. (2018) obtain evi-
dence consistent with informed premerger trading by using daily posterior probabilities of informed buying and sell-
ing obtained from information on individual trades. Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) and Lowry, Rossi, and Zhu
(2018) note insider trading activity amongM&Abidder advisors.More generally, Bhattacharya,Daouk, Jorgenson, and
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Kehr (2000) focus on a wider range of corporate announcements in a Mexican setting, where differences between A
and B class shares allow them to disentangle anticipation from an insider trading explanation for preannouncement
stock price movement. Their findings suggest widespread insider trading prior to corporate announcements. Also
consistent with an insider trading explanation, Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready (2017) find a negative rela-
tion between staff and budget resources available to the SEC from 2003 to 2011 and run-ups before major corporate
announcements including takeovers.
To conclude, while previous studies provide evidence supporting both deal anticipation and insider trading, there is
no clarity yet on the relative importance of these explanations for target run-ups. Our paper contributes to the litera-
ture by documenting and explaining the declining trend in target run-ups from the 1980s, the period covered bymost
previous studies, until 2018.1 Our long research window enables us to exploit the increasingly stringent insider trad-
ing regulations in theUnited States over time.We control for awide range of deal- and firm-specific proxies suggested
by the literature, allowing us to test the relative importance of deal anticipation and insider trading explanations for
target run-ups.
3 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND TARGET RUN-UPS
This section describes the data set of M&A deals, the measurement of target run-ups, and the evolution of abnormal
stock returns for the target firms over our sample period.
3.1 Sample
The sample consists ofM&As inwhichU.S. domiciled firms (labeled “bidders”) acquireU.S. domiciledpublicly held firms
(labeled “targets”). The research period is January 1985 to December 2018.We obtain deals from ThomsonONE. For
deals to be retained in the final sample, the following standard inclusion criteriamust apply (Cao, Li, & Liu, 2019; Fuller,
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2016; Martin, 1996): The bidder purchases at least 50%
of the target shares, the deal value is at least 1% of the market value of the bidder, the market value of the target firm
is at least $1 million, the deal is not withdrawn, and the target firm’s stock price data are available from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) over the year prior to the deal announcement.2 Private bidders include pri-
vate equity and private operating firms.We remove privately held bidder deals with “Investor Group,” “Bondholders,”
“Creditors,” or “Shareholders” instead of a firm name listed as “Acquirer Name” in Thomson ONE since we focus on
bidding firms, not groups of investors (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008). After imposing these criteria,
we obtain an initial sample consisting of 7,962M&A deals.
In a subsequent step, we eliminate deals with missing values for the deal anticipation proxies discussed in the next
section.Oneof thedeal anticipationproxies,Target-bidder ratio, has bidder total assets as its denominator. This variable
is missing in ThomsonONE and Capital IQ for 474 of 564 deals with private bidders.3 To avoid a large loss of privately
held bidder deals from the onset of our empirical tests, we do not require the availability of Target-bidder ratio for the
univariate analyses.We obtain a sample of 2,816M&Adeals for the univariate tests. Our baseline regression analyses
include Target-bidder ratio as a (significant) control variable leading to a reduced final sample size of 2,279 deals.4 In
1 Betton et al. (2014, table 3) report the annual distribution of target run-ups for U.S. M&As from 1980 to 2008 as part of their descriptive statistics. They
also document smaller run-ups toward the end of their sample period. However, they do not mention or attempt to explain the decline in target run-ups over
time.
2 By construction, we can only impose this criterion for public bidders. Our baseline results do not materially change whenwe remove this constraint.
3 Wewere able to obtain bidder total assets from ThomsonONE for 23 private bidders.We found total assets for an additional 67 private bidders on Capital
IQ, bringing the total of private bidders to 90.
4 Target-bidder ratio is missing for 63 deals with publicly held bidders.
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robustness tests described further, we verify that our regression results remain similar whenwe do not include Target-
bidder ratio as a control variable enabling us to use the larger sample of 2,816 deals.
3.2 Measuring target run-ups
We use market model regressions to estimate abnormal stock returns. We estimate the regressions over a period
of 190 trading days ending at trading day −76 relative to the deal’s announcement date retrieved from Thomson
ONE. We use the CRSP equally weighted index as a proxy for the market portfolio. We define our main target run-
up measure as the cumulative abnormal stock return over the 20 trading days before the deal announcement date.
Several previous studies use a similar time window for calculating target run-ups (Dennis & McConnell, 1986; Jarrell
& Poulsen, 1989). In robustness tests discussed below, we use alternative run-up measures suggested by the litera-
ture. We winsorize target run-ups, as well as continuous control variables at the 5% and 95% levels to avoid outliers
affecting the results. Our results remain similar whenwewinsorize at the 1% and 99% levels.
3.3 Trend in target run-ups
Figure 1 plotsmedian target run-ups over five-year intervalswithin the research period. The final interval is nine years
long as our sample period ends in 2018. In line with previous studies, the figure reports evidence of positive target
abnormal stock returns prior toM&A announcement dates. However, run-ups clearly become substantially smaller in
more recent intervals. Average run-ups, which we do not show for brevity, show a similar trend.
Table 1, Panel A, provides quantitative evidence of the evolution in target run-ups over time. It gives a breakdown
of average and median run-ups over each of the intervals. Column (1) reports an average abnormal stock return of
approximately10% for theearliest timeperiod (1985-1989), consistentwith themagnitudeof target run-ups reported
in prior studies (Keown&Pinkerton, 1981;Meulbroek, 1992; Schwert, 1996). Average target run-ups tend to become
smaller over time. At the end of the sample period (2010-2018), we find average run-ups of only 3.75%. Median run-
ups showa similar pattern, steadily dropping from9.02% in the initial interval to 2.18% in themost recent interval.We
note that there are no further declines between 2005-2009 and 2010-2018. Regressing the run-ups on a yearly time
trend variable and an intercept, we find a significant negative annual time trend of −0.26% for average run-ups and
−0.25% for median run-ups.
We also consider target run-ups over a longer window. Sixty trading days before the announcement date seems
to be the longest preannouncement window considered in the run-up literature (Brigida & Madura, 2012; Keown &
Pinkerton, 1981), so we use this window as an alternative run-up measure. As Column (2) indicates, we find a similar
pattern for this measure.
Event studies based on older data often include the return on trading day −1 as part of the announcement effect.
The rationale behind this practice is that there may be a one-day time lag between the actual announcement of the
news by the company and the publication of that announcement in outlets such as theWall Street Journal. This time lag
is likely to be more prevalent for the first decades of our sample period, as investors did not yet heavily rely on elec-
tronic news sources during those earlier years. To verify that the target run-up measure does not reflect the news of
the public announcement of the merger on the trading day immediately before day 0, we redefine it as the abnormal
target stock return over trading days−20 to−2 prior to themerger announcement. As Column (3) indicates, our find-
ings remain similar to those for the original run-upmeasure. In the remainder of the paper, wemeasure target run-ups
over trading days−20 to−1.
Next, we verify whether there is any trend in target announcement returns over the research period. We mea-
sure these over the M&A announcement date and the subsequent trading day to account for announcements that
have been made after stock market closure or on a nontrading day. Column (4) presents a positive trend in target
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F IGURE 1 Median target stock run-ups over six subperiods of the research period [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note. This figure reports themedian daily target firm abnormal stock returns for six subperiods within our research
window of 1985-2018. The sample consists of 2,816M&As involving U.S. bidder and target firms from 1985 to 2018
obtained from ThomsonONE. Days represent trading days relative to theM&A announcement date retrieved from
ThomsonONE. Abnormal stock returns are estimatedwithmarket model regressions.We estimate these regressions
over a period of 190 days ending on day−76 relative to the announcement date.We use the CRSP equally weighted
index as a proxy for themarket portfolio.
announcement returns. Average (median) returns increase from 15.35% (12.52%) from 1985 to 1989 to 23.01%
(19.46%) from 2010 to 2018. Combined with the findings in Columns (1)–(3), this pattern suggests that the decline
in target run-ups is compensated by an increase in announcement period returns. Corroborating this insight, Column
(5) indicates that total (preannouncement plus announcement period) stock price effects for the target firms remain
largely stable over time. Accordingly, we do not find a significant time trend for the average ormedian total returns.
Somestudies consider run-up indexmeasures, constructedas the ratioof target run-ups to totalM&A-related stock
price effects (Bris, 2005; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989). In line with these studies, we present run-up index ratios in Column
(6). Consistentwith the results reported in the previous columns,we find that the proportion of target run-ups relative
to total stock price effects steadily decreases over timewith a statistically significant negative time trend both for the
average and median ratios. In particular, while the median ratio is higher than 40% at the start of our research period,
which is consistent with previous studies (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Meulbroek, 1992), it drops to approximately 10%
toward the end of our research period.
4 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TREND IN TARGET RUN-UPS
This section examines potential reasons for the significant decline in target run-ups over the past decades. We begin
by exploring the deal anticipation hypothesis and then turn to changes in insider trading as a potential explanation.
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4.1 Deal anticipation hypothesis
According to the deal anticipation hypothesis, target run-ups are caused by legal trading activity by market partici-
pants who can predict targets of upcoming deals. From this viewpoint, the decline in target run-ups could result from
a reduced ability of informed traders to anticipate future targets based on publicly available information. One poten-
tial reason for a reduction in target predictability is that deal or firm characteristics associated with investors’ ability
to anticipate deals have changed over time. To examine this possibility, we analyze whether the trend in target run-
ups persists after controlling for variables associated with a greater likelihood of deal anticipation by investors. The
Appendix provides detailed definitions of all of the variables and their sources.
We construct the following deal anticipation proxies suggested by the literature using information from Thomson
ONE:
Rumor: A dummy variable capturing whether there have been media rumors about the deal before its official
announcement. Deals preceded by rumors are likely to be more anticipated by the market (Gupta & Misra,
1989).
Toehold: A dummy variable equal to one when the bidder has an equity stake in the target firm before the deal
announcement. A pre-M&A equity stakemay signal a takeover intention andmake the deal more predictable
(Betton et al., 2014; Brigida & Madura, 2012). Alternatively, a toehold stake tends to decrease the remain-
ing target shareholders’ takeover gains, which might reduce the probability of an eventual takeover taking
place (Stulz, Walkling, & Song, 1990). The impact of the Toehold dummy variable on the likelihood of a deal is
therefore unclear.
Cash financing: Measures the percentage of cash financing for the target firm. Cash-financed deals could bemore
anticipated (Brigida & Madura, 2012) as firms often must raise debt financing through bank syndicates to
obtain the cashpayments required for a deal. Syndicates could foster a largedegreeof premerger information
exploitation (Acharya & Johnson, 2010). Alternatively, stock-financed deals could bemore anticipated due to
the negotiation and potential shareholder approval associated with these deals.
Hostile: A dummy variable equal to one for hostile deals. Hostile bidders typically try tomake the bid a surprise in
order to reduce the target’s potential to activate takeover defenses. Under this scenario, hostile bids may be
less anticipated than friendly bids, which tend to involve predeal negotiations increasing the likelihood that
the market learns about the deal before its official announcement. However, some hostile bidders attempt
to place target firm stocks in the hands of arbitrageurs, who are typically more willing to tender their shares.
Under this scenario, hostile bids might be more anticipated than friendly bids. The relation between the hos-
tile nature of bids and their anticipation is therefore unclear (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989).
Poison pill: A dummy variable equal to one for targets with a poison pill provision in place. Investors might expect
firms with poison pill takeover defenses could be less likely to become a takeover target (Malatesta &Walk-
ling, 1988), althoughComment andSchwert (1995) find that poisonpill rights typically donotdeter takeovers.
Number of bidders: If more firms are interested in the target, the deal is more likely to be anticipated.
We also construct the following standard target-specific deal anticipation determinants using Compustat balance
sheet and CRSP stock price data:
Market-to-book: Firms with lowmarket-to-book ratios are often perceived as cheap, even though the book value
of assets does not necessarily reflect their replacement value (Palepu, 1986). Moreover, lower market-to-
book ratios could indicate low growth opportunities suggesting shareholder value can be improved through a
takeover (Espahbodi&Espahbodi, 2003). Thus, a lowmarket-to-bookvalue shouldbeassociatedwith ahigher
anticipated likelihood of becoming a target firm.
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FCF:Measures free cash flow over total assets. Firms with greater values for this ratio tend to have lower invest-
ment opportunities andmore agencyproblems (Jensen, 1986). As such, these firms aremore likely to be taken
over by acquirers who spot room for improvement (Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003).
Dividend yield: Firms with a high dividend yield typically have fewer growth opportunities, higher agency costs,
and more financial constraints making themmore likely to be targeted for anM&A deal (Espahbodi & Espah-
bodi, 2003). Higher dividend payments could also reduce the opportunity costs for investors to purchase tar-
get stocks beforemerger announcements.
Sales growth: This variable acts as a measure of firm growth and should be negatively related to the odds of being
targeted for a takeover (Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003).
Growth-resource (GR) mismatch: This variable is inspired by the GR imbalance hypothesis that indicates growth
(as captured by changes in sales) and resource availability (as captured by leverage and cash reserves) are
important drivers of a firm’s likelihood of becoming a takeover target. In particular, firms with high growth
and low liquidity, or low growth and high liquidity, are more likely to be taken over (Palepu, 1986). The GR
mismatch dummy is equal to one for these firms and zero otherwise.
Leverage: In addition to the GRmismatch dummy variable, we also separately control for target leverage and liq-
uidity (described below). Firmswith high leverage are typically less attractive as takeover targets as an acqui-
sition of low debt firms is less costly to finance (Song &Walkling, 2000).
Liquidity:Measured by cash reserves. Firmswith higher cash reserves have a greater likelihood of being acquired
as there is an opportunity for the bidders to finance the acquisition with the target’s own resources (Espah-
bodi & Espahbodi, 2003; Song &Walkling, 1993).
Firm size: Captures the size of the target firm as measured by total assets converted into constant 1980s U.S.
dollars using the U.S. Consumer Price Index obtained from Datastream. Smaller firms are more likely to end
up as targets forM&A deals (Ambrose &Megginson, 1992; Song &Walkling, 2000).
Historical stock return: Consistent with Palepu (1986), we use excess stock returns over the past four years as a
proxy for management efficiency. Firms managed by inefficient managers are more likely to be taken over.
Hence, this variable has a negative predicted association with deal anticipation as lower historical stock
returns should reflect a greater likelihood of being acquired.
State: Dummy variable equal to one for firms incorporated in Delaware. This state has the toughest antitakeover
laws in the United States, which could potentially make its incumbent firms less likely to be targeted (Espah-
bodi & Espahbodi, 2003), although Comment and Schwert (1995) find only weak evidence for any mitigating
impact of antitakeover laws on takeover frequency.
Finally, we include two further control variables in the target run-up analysis:
Private bidder: While we do not have a clear prediction as to whether deals with privately held bidders are more
likely to be anticipated, privately held bidders are typicallymore disciplined in their bidding, leading to smaller
anticipated premiums and, as such, lower predicted target run-ups (Bargeron et al., 2008).
Target-bidder ratio:Measures the relative sizesof the target andbidding firmsandcancapturedeal complexity and
postmerger integration costs (Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013; Malmendier, Moretti, & Peters,
2018).We do not have clear expectations for the relation of this variable with deal anticipation either.
Table 2 reports the median target run-up values for subsamples split according to the above characteristics. For
binary deal and firm characteristics, the split is straightforward. For continuous characteristics, we split the sample
into subsamples based on their median value.
Column (1) creates subsamples using deals over the entire sample period. The values in italics below the full period
target run-upmedians represent the differences in themedian target run-up values between each pair of subsamples
10 DUTORDOIR ET AL.
T
A
B
L
E
2
Ta
rg
et
ru
n
-u
p
s
by
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
b
as
ed
o
n
d
ea
la
n
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
p
ro
xi
es
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Su
b
sa
m
p
le
1
9
8
5
-2
0
1
8
(1
)
1
9
8
5
-1
9
8
9
(2
)
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
4
(3
)
1
9
9
5
-1
9
9
9
(4
)
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
4
(5
)
2
0
0
5
-2
0
0
9
(6
)
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
8
(7
)
Tr
en
d
(8
)
p-
va
lu
e(
9
)
R
u
m
o
r
(+
)
0
3
.5
9
0
8
.5
3
5
7
.4
3
0
5
.7
8
5
3
.5
7
0
1
.7
7
0
1
.9
3
0
–
0
.2
6
4
0
.0
0
0
1
6
.3
6
0
1
8
.6
1
0
1
1
.0
0
0
1
2
.1
3
0
7
.0
4
0
4
.9
3
0
3
.4
7
0
–
0
.3
4
7
0
.0
0
0
Δ
2.
77
0*
**
To
eh
o
ld
(+
)
0
3
.8
0
0
8
.8
7
5
7
.7
9
5
6
.6
4
0
3
.8
9
0
2
.1
6
5
2
.1
9
0
–
0
.2
6
2
0
.0
0
0
1
4
.8
1
0
1
1
.7
0
0
7
.2
6
5
–
0
.3
5
0
1
1
.7
0
0
1
.4
3
0
0
.9
9
0
–
0
.3
1
1
0
.0
0
7
Δ
1.
01
0
C
as
h
fi
n
an
ci
n
g
(+
/–
)
Lo
w
3
.6
8
0
1
.0
9
0
7
.5
9
0
5
.7
5
0
3
.8
0
0
2
.0
6
0
1
.3
3
5
–
0
.2
2
3
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.9
9
0
1
2
.1
5
0
8
.3
9
0
7
.6
6
0
4
.5
9
0
2
.2
7
0
2
.7
2
0
–
0
.3
1
2
0
.0
0
0
Δ
0.
31
0
H
o
st
ile
(+
/–
)
0
3
.9
5
0
9
.0
2
5
7
.7
9
5
6
.3
6
0
3
.9
4
0
2
.3
8
0
2
.2
4
0
–
0
.2
6
3
0
.0
0
0
1
1
.8
8
0
7
.6
5
0
1
9
.1
4
5
–
0
.9
6
0
1
0
.2
2
0
–
3
.1
4
5
0
.8
4
0
–
0
.2
3
3
0
.1
7
6
Δ
–2
.0
70
P
o
is
o
n
p
ill
(+
)
0
3
.8
8
5
9
.0
2
5
7
.7
9
5
6
.0
5
0
4
.1
4
0
2
.1
8
0
2
.2
1
5
–
0
.2
5
8
0
.0
0
0
1
2
.5
5
0
8
.3
0
0
7
.5
2
0
8
.5
5
5
–
6
.9
3
0
–
1
.3
4
0
–
9
.8
9
5
–
1
.0
2
5
0
.0
0
7
Δ
–1
.3
35
N
u
m
b
er
o
fb
id
d
er
s
(+
/–
)
Lo
w
3
.6
8
0
6
.9
3
0
7
.7
5
0
6
.3
4
0
3
.8
9
0
2
.1
6
5
2
.0
7
0
–
0
.2
4
4
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
9
.1
2
0
1
5
.3
9
0
1
1
.7
9
0
4
.3
6
0
1
0
.5
0
0
2
.9
4
5
6
.7
1
0
–
0
.3
2
7
0
.0
0
5
Δ
5.
44
0*
**
M
ar
ke
t-
to
-b
o
o
k
(–
)
Lo
w
3
.8
3
0
1
0
.0
9
0
6
.2
2
0
5
.8
5
0
3
.7
6
0
2
.4
0
0
1
.6
0
5
–
0
.2
9
0
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.9
2
5
8
.0
3
5
8
.7
0
5
6
.2
4
0
4
.2
3
0
2
.0
7
0
2
.7
5
5
–
0
.2
2
3
0
.0
0
0
Δ
0.
09
5
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
es
)
DUTORDOIR ET AL. 11
T
A
B
L
E
2
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Su
b
sa
m
p
le
1
9
8
5
-2
0
1
8
(1
)
1
9
8
5
-1
9
8
9
(2
)
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
4
(3
)
1
9
9
5
-1
9
9
9
(4
)
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
4
(5
)
2
0
0
5
-2
0
0
9
(6
)
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
8
(7
)
Tr
en
d
(8
)
p-
va
lu
e(
9
)
F
C
F
(+
)
Lo
w
4
.5
8
0
9
.9
4
0
6
.6
6
0
6
.6
4
0
4
.1
6
0
3
.3
5
0
1
.8
5
0
–
0
.2
6
3
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.2
5
0
5
.5
9
0
9
.1
7
0
5
.8
3
5
3
.8
0
0
1
.5
6
0
2
.4
3
5
–
0
.2
4
8
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–1
.3
30
**
D
iv
id
en
d
yi
el
d
(+
)
Lo
w
4
.4
9
5
9
.0
3
0
8
.7
4
0
7
.9
6
5
5
.3
2
0
2
.4
7
0
2
.2
0
5
–
0
.3
0
8
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.2
7
5
8
.8
5
5
3
.4
0
0
5
.2
4
0
2
.6
3
0
1
.6
8
0
2
.1
7
0
–
0
.2
1
4
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–1
.2
20
*
Sa
le
s
gr
o
w
th
(–
)
Lo
w
3
.4
3
5
7
.6
9
0
5
.9
3
5
6
.3
0
0
2
.8
3
5
3
.1
0
5
2
.3
8
5
–
0
.2
1
2
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
4
.5
2
5
9
.5
6
0
8
.9
1
0
5
.8
8
5
5
.1
7
5
1
.9
2
0
1
.9
4
0
–
0
.3
1
9
0
.0
0
0
Δ
1.
09
0
G
R
m
is
m
at
ch
(+
)
0
4
.0
7
0
9
.0
2
0
7
.9
6
5
6
.3
8
5
3
.7
3
0
2
.1
8
0
1
.9
8
0
–
0
.2
6
5
0
.0
0
0
1
3
.5
1
0
9
.4
1
5
7
.6
4
0
5
.6
5
0
5
.3
1
0
2
.1
5
0
2
.2
5
0
–
0
.2
5
7
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–0
.5
60
Le
ve
ra
ge
(–
)
Lo
w
3
.9
9
5
1
0
.3
2
0
8
.7
0
5
6
.6
0
0
6
.1
3
5
1
.5
6
0
1
.5
4
0
–
0
.3
4
7
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.4
7
5
7
.0
0
5
6
.1
5
5
5
.7
3
5
2
.6
1
5
2
.9
4
0
2
.7
4
0
–
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–0
.5
20
Li
q
u
id
it
y
(+
)
Lo
w
4
.2
3
5
9
.0
2
5
7
.3
3
0
6
.8
0
5
4
.1
4
0
2
.4
1
0
1
.5
4
0
–
0
.3
1
9
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.4
6
5
8
.9
5
0
8
.5
3
0
5
.6
5
0
3
.8
9
5
2
.1
1
0
2
.6
7
0
–
0
.2
1
0
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–0
.7
70
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
es
)
12 DUTORDOIR ET AL.
T
A
B
L
E
2
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Su
b
sa
m
p
le
1
9
8
5
-2
0
1
8
(1
)
1
9
8
5
-1
9
8
9
(2
)
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
4
(3
)
1
9
9
5
-1
9
9
9
(4
)
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
4
(5
)
2
0
0
5
-2
0
0
9
(6
)
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
8
(7
)
Tr
en
d
(8
)
p-
va
lu
e(
9
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
(–
)
Lo
w
4
.7
6
5
1
0
.3
2
0
8
.4
9
5
8
.1
2
0
5
.5
5
0
1
.8
4
0
1
.0
5
0
–
0
.3
5
9
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.3
1
0
7
.3
6
5
5
.2
7
5
4
.9
7
5
2
.7
1
0
2
.3
4
5
2
.5
4
0
–
0
.1
5
5
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–1
.4
55
**
*
H
is
t.
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
(–
)
Lo
w
3
.9
3
0
8
.3
6
0
5
.9
3
5
6
.6
0
0
4
.6
5
0
2
.7
9
5
1
.9
3
5
–
0
.2
0
1
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.7
6
0
9
.0
2
0
8
.9
6
5
5
.6
6
5
3
.6
7
0
1
.4
6
5
2
.4
3
5
–
0
.3
5
3
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–0
.1
70
St
at
e
(–
)
0
3
.5
8
0
7
.6
7
0
8
.2
7
0
5
.8
2
0
2
.9
0
0
2
.9
4
0
1
.6
0
5
–
0
.2
6
9
0
.0
0
0
1
4
.0
7
0
1
1
.1
0
0
6
.9
6
0
6
.6
2
0
4
.6
9
0
1
.9
0
0
2
.7
0
5
–
0
.2
6
8
0
.0
0
0
Δ
0.
49
0
P
ri
va
te
b
id
d
er
(+
/–
)
0
3
.9
8
5
9
.7
9
0
8
.2
7
0
6
.0
5
0
4
.3
5
0
2
.0
6
0
2
.1
7
0
–
0
.2
6
9
0
.0
0
0
1
3
.2
4
5
8
.8
2
0
3
.5
7
0
5
.8
6
0
1
.7
6
5
2
.5
5
5
2
.3
0
0
–
0
.2
2
9
0
.0
0
2
Δ
–0
.7
40
Ta
rg
et
-b
id
d
er
ra
ti
o
(+
/–
)
Lo
w
3
.9
1
5
6
.9
0
5
8
.1
8
0
6
.8
7
0
5
.0
9
0
2
.4
9
0
1
.5
4
0
–
0
.2
6
0
0
.0
0
0
H
ig
h
3
.8
9
0
9
.9
4
0
8
.1
5
0
5
.6
5
0
3
.7
6
0
2
.1
6
5
2
.6
7
0
–
0
.2
5
5
0
.0
0
0
Δ
–0
.0
25
N
ot
e.
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
ta
rg
et
ru
n
-u
p
s
fo
r
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
b
as
ed
o
n
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
d
ea
la
n
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
.+
,(
–
),
an
d
(+
/–
)n
ex
t
to
a
va
ri
ab
le
n
am
e
in
d
ic
at
e
a
p
o
si
ti
ve
,
n
eg
at
iv
e,
an
d
am
b
ig
u
o
u
s
re
la
ti
o
n
w
it
h
d
ea
la
n
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
.T
h
e
to
ta
ls
am
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
2
,8
1
6
M
&
A
s
in
vo
lv
in
g
U
.S
.b
id
d
er
an
d
U
.S
.p
u
b
lic
ly
h
el
d
ta
rg
et
fi
rm
s
fr
o
m
1
9
8
5
to
2
0
1
8
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
T
h
o
m
so
n
O
N
E
.T
ar
ge
t-
bi
dd
er
ra
ti
o
is
o
n
ly
av
ai
la
b
le
fo
r
2
,2
7
9
o
f
th
es
e
M
&
A
s.
W
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
ta
rg
et
ru
n
-u
p
s
as
ab
n
o
rm
al
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
s
ov
er
tr
ad
in
g
d
ay
s
−
2
0
to
−
1
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
M
&
A
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t
d
at
e
re
tr
ie
ve
d
fr
o
m
T
h
o
m
so
n
O
N
E
.W
e
cr
ea
te
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
fo
r
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
o
n
a
0
/1
b
as
is
.W
e
cr
ea
te
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
fo
r
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
va
ri
ab
le
s
u
si
n
g
th
ei
r
m
ed
ia
n
va
lu
e.
Fo
r
ea
ch
su
b
sa
m
p
le
,w
e
re
p
o
rt
m
ed
ia
n
ta
rg
et
st
o
ck
ru
n
-u
p
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
ov
er
th
e
en
ti
re
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
(C
o
lu
m
n
(1
))
,a
s
w
el
la
s
fo
r
si
x
su
b
p
er
io
d
s
(C
o
lu
m
n
s
(2
)-
(7
))
.T
h
e
va
lu
es
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
it
al
ic
s
in
th
e
1
9
8
5
-2
0
1
8
co
lu
m
n
re
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
(Δ
)i
n
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
s
fo
r
th
e
o
n
e
vs
.z
er
o
(d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s)
o
r
H
ig
h
vs
.L
o
w
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
va
ri
ab
le
s)
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s.
W
e
as
se
ss
th
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
o
f
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
in
m
ed
ia
n
s
u
si
n
g
a
W
ilc
ox
o
n
te
st
.F
o
r
ea
ch
su
b
sa
m
p
le
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
),
w
e
re
gr
es
s
ta
rg
et
ru
n
-u
p
s
o
n
a
ye
ar
ly
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
va
ri
ab
le
an
d
an
in
te
rc
ep
t
u
si
n
g
th
e
en
ti
re
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
.W
e
re
p
o
rt
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
an
d
p-
va
lu
e
o
ft
h
e
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
in
th
e
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s
o
ft
h
is
ta
b
le
.T
h
e
A
p
p
en
d
ix
p
ro
vi
d
es
va
ri
ab
le
d
ef
in
it
io
n
s.
*,
**
,a
n
d
**
*
in
d
ic
at
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
o
ft
h
e
(u
n
re
p
o
rt
ed
)W
ilc
ox
o
n
te
st
st
at
is
ti
c
at
th
e
1
0
%
,5
%
,a
n
d
1
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
p
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
DUTORDOIR ET AL. 13
based on deal and firm characteristics.5 Superscripted asterisks indicate the significance of (unreported) Wilcoxon
test statistics for the differences in the full period subsample medians. We expect larger target run-ups for deals that
are more likely to be anticipated by investors. Consistent with this prediction, we find higher run-ups for deals with
preannouncement information leakage as captured by a Rumor dummy variable equal to one. Also in line with this
prediction, we obtain higher run-ups for deals with higherNumber of bidders and lower run-ups for deals with a larger
target Firm size. Inconsistent with our expectations, however, we find higher run-ups for deals with lower FCF and
Dividend yield. We do not find significant differences in run-ups when splitting the sample according to the other deal
and firm characteristics.
Themain goal of this univariate analysis is to establishwhether the significant time trend in run-ups persists across
subsamples based on various characteristics associated with deal anticipation. In Columns (2)–(7), we report median
target run-ups for subsamples based on characteristics in six subperiods within the overall sample period. Target run-
ups tend to decline over time except for the subsample of Hostile deals for which the pattern in run-ups is less clear.
As a more formal test, we regress the target run-ups on an annual Trend variable, defined as the announcement year
of the deal minus 1985, the first year of the sample period, and an intercept for each of the individual subsamples.
Columns (8) and (9) report a negative time trend (i.e., significant at less than 1%) in target run-ups across each of the
subsamples that we consider except for the subsample of Hostile deals. We note that only very few of the deals in our
data set (i.e., 93 of 2,816) are marked as “hostile” in Thomson ONE. Empirically distinguishing hostile from nonhostile
deals is problematic (Schwert, 2000), sowedonot placemuchweight on thenonsignificance ofTrend for this very small
subset of deals. The magnitude of the Trend variable is typically higher (i.e., more negative) for those subsamples with
a relatively high median target run-up in the early part of the sample period. Overall, we conclude that the decline in
target run-ups over time seems robust across deals with different characteristics.
Next, we conduct an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression inwhichwe regress target run-ups on the above char-
acteristics associatedwith deal anticipation. Table 3 presents the regression results. Reported t-statistics of all regres-
sions in the paper are based on robust standard errors. We follow a similar approach to Custódio, Ferreira, and Lau-
reano (2013) in their analysis of the decline in corporate debt maturity. In a first model, reported in Column (1), we
include deal anticipation proxies without time trend controls. Among the deal characteristics, Rumor has a significant
impact with the predicted positive sign. For the target characteristics, we find a negative impact for Firm size, in line
with our predictions. In addition, we find a negative impact of FCF, which is inconsistent with the argument that firms
with higher free cash flows aremore likely to be acquired as theymay have run out of profitable growth opportunities.
We also find a negative impact for Target-bidder ratio for which we have no clear expectations. The R2 of the model is
approximately 4%, which is a similar order ofmagnitude as the R2s in the Brigida andMadura (2012) analysis of target
run-ups.
In Column (2), we include five time period dummy variables. The dummies are constructed so that they show the
incremental effect of a certain timeperiodwhencompared to theperiod immediately prior.We finda significant reduc-
tion in target run-ups from the 1995-1999 period to the 2000-2004 period, and from the 2000-2004 period to the
2005-2009 period. This result suggests that changes in deal- and firm-specific deal anticipation proxies cannot fully
account for the decline in target run-ups.With regard to the deal anticipation proxies, we now find a significant impact
for Cash financing that was insignificant in the previousmodel. The positive sign of its coefficient is consistent with the
conjecture that cash deals are more anticipated. The results for the other proxies remain largely similar to those in
Column (1). Themodel in Column (3) replicates the previousmodel including year dummy variables instead of interval
dummies. The year dummy variables take a value of one if the deal was announced that year and are zero otherwise.
There are 33 year dummies in total starting in 1986 and ending in 2018.Wedonot report the coefficients of individual
year dummy variables for parsimony. An F-test statistic for the significance of the year dummy variables equals 4.63,
strongly rejecting the null hypothesis that their coefficients are jointly equal to zero (p-value< 0.001).
5 In unreported tests, we obtain similar results when focusing on averages.
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TABLE 3 OLS Regression of target run-ups
Deal anticipation Insider trading
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend –0.257*** –0.278*** 0.082
(–8.323) (–8.538) (0.691)
Rumor 4.709*** 4.804*** 4.633*** 4.803*** 4.765***
(5.530) (5.748) (5.585) (5.765) (5.732)
Toehold 0.280 –1.030 –0.847 –0.968 –0.886
(0.205) (–0.757) (–0.609) (–0.723) (–0.652)
Cash financing 0.003 0.017** 0.018** 0.013* 0.018**
(0.497) (2.396) (2.461) (1.942) (2.500)
Hostile –1.195 –0.445 –0.896 –0.200 –0.447
(–0.620) (–0.238) (–0.477) (–0.106) (–0.238)
Poison pill 1.581 –0.712 –0.444 –1.203 –0.826
(0.475) (–0.214) (–0.134) (–0.364) (–0.240)
Number of bidders 1.474 0.320 0.553 0.197 0.313
(1.488) (0.328) (0.580) (0.203) (0.322)
Market-to-book –0.076 –0.020 –0.097 –0.005 –0.073
(–0.429) (–0.115) (–0.544) (–0.031) (–0.415)
FCF –5.446* –5.890** –5.666** –5.889** –5.773**
(–1.921) (–2.125) (–2.005) (–2.109) (–2.093)
Dividend yield –4.529 –10.053 –8.615 –11.626 –9.229
(–0.282) (–0.625) (–0.541) (–0.722) (–0.576)
Sales growth 0.009 –0.004 –0.010 –0.004 –0.009
(0.560) (–0.253) (–0.615) (–0.228) (–0.549)
GRmismatch –0.122 0.157 0.136 0.130 0.283
(–0.166) (0.216) (0.188) (0.179) (0.390)
Leverage –0.049 0.057 0.205 –0.004 0.196
(–0.127) (0.147) (0.531) (–0.010) (0.507)
Liquidity –0.073 0.753 0.729 0.332 0.833
(–0.063) (0.654) (0.622) (0.290) (0.723)
Firm size –1.020*** –0.666*** –0.641*** –0.703*** –0.643***
(–4.970) (–3.201) (–3.064) (–3.399) (–3.083)
Historical stock return –3.959 –3.204 1.780 –4.471 –0.323
(–1.032) (–0.822) (0.416) (–1.180) (–0.081)
State –0.163 0.118 0.090 0.170 0.155
(–0.283) (0.207) (0.157) (0.298) (0.272)
Private bidder 0.572 1.049 1.225 0.736 0.933
(0.394) (0.719) (0.811) (0.509) (0.638)
(Continues)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Deal anticipation Insider trading
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Target-bidder ratio –0.572** –0.673*** –0.655*** –0.629*** –0.676***
(–2.514) (–3.002) (–2.915) (–2.799) (–3.023)
1990-1994 –0.487
(–0.291)
1995-1999 –0.558
(–0.432)
2000-2004 –2.512***
(–2.914)
2005-2009 –2.751***
(–3.102)
2010-2018 –0.183
(–0.244)
IT event 1 (11/19/1988) –1.878
(–0.993)
IT event 2 (10/23/2000) –3.254***
(–2.622)
IT event 3 (08/14/2003) –2.933***
(–2.606)
IT event 4 (01/27/2009) –0.883
(–0.718)
Constant 12.072*** 14.312*** 16.887*** 10.823*** 16.116*** 14.168***
(6.050) (5.893) (5.084) (16.227) (7.924) (5.611)
R2 0.032 0.064 0.088 0.027 0.059 0.069
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No No
N 2,279 2,279 2,279 2,279 2,279 2,279
Note.This table reports the estimates of theOLS regressions of target run-ups ondeal- and firm-specific explanatory variables.
The sample consists of 2,279 M&As involving U.S. bidder and target firms from 1985–2018 obtained from Thomson ONE.
We calculate target run-ups as abnormal stock returns over trading days –20 to –1 relative to the M&A announcement date
retrieved from Thomson ONE. The Appendix provides the variable definitions. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors,
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.N denotes the num-
ber of observations.
In the remaining analyses,weworkwith aTrend variable insteadof interval dummies, as a time trend variablemakes
it easier to quantify themagnitudeof the annual decrease in target run-ups. InColumn (4),we runabaseline regression
in which we only include an annual time trend and an intercept. We find a significant decrease in target run-ups of
−0.26% per year. In Column (5), we test whether this time trend persists when controlling for deal- and firm-specific
deal anticipation proxies.We find that this is the case. The coefficient of the Trend variable (−0.28%) remains negative
and significant.
In unreported tests, we include several other control variables. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find a higher
takeover probability for firms with a higher percentage of tangible assets that may be due to these firms having more
debt capacity or fewer growth opportunities. Our findings remain unaltered when controlling for the target firms’
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tangible assets. Our results also remain similarwhenwe control for fluctuations in interest rates to capture the oppor-
tunity cost investors face when purchasing target shares before predicted merger announcements, as well as for
annual volumes ofM&A deals to capture increased takeover activity over time and for industry fixed effects.
On the whole, the univariate analyses in Table 2 and the regression results in Columns (2)–(5) of Table 3 suggest
that the decline in target run-ups does not seem fully attributable to the changes in deal and firm characteristics asso-
ciated with deal anticipation. However, these tests cannot completely rule out a deal anticipation explanation of the
decline in run-ups for the following two reasons. First, even with deal and firm characteristics remaining constant, it
mayhave become less straightforward for investors to predict upcomingM&A targets.M&Amotives change over time
(Bruner, 2004), which could make traditional target prediction models less capable of identifying targets. Of course,
market participants nowadays have a wealth of information and sophisticated prediction tools at their fingertips, but
it could still be more difficult for them to weed out relevant pieces of information and accurately predict target firms.
If investors refrain from preannouncement buying of target stocks when their predictors get noisier, we would see
a decline in run-ups over time even after controlling for traditional deal anticipation proxies. In addition, even with
constant deal anticipation proxies and unchanged investor ability to predict target firms, there could be a reduced
likelihood in the probability of deal completion for more recent M&As. This could result in lower preannouncement
target run-ups (Betton et al., 2014). Several of the deal anticipation proxies in our model can also act as proxies for
the likelihood of deal completion. For example, Hostile deals are typically less likely to complete and merger payment,
as captured in Cash financing, could also affect the probability of deal completion (Baker & Savas¸oglu, 2002). For com-
pleteness, we reestimateColumn (5) of Table 3 including a deal completion probability, estimated froma logisticmodel
for deal completion derived from Baker and Savas¸oglu (2002), as an additional explanatory variable. Our conclusions
remain unaltered suggesting that changes in predicted deal completion likelihood do not drive the results.6
In sum, while we cannot completely eliminate a deal anticipation explanation for the decline in target run-ups, we
do not obtain empirical results consistent with this explanation. In the next subsection, we explore the insider trading
hypothesis as an alternative explanation.
4.2 Insider trading hypothesis
The insider trading hypothesis argues that target run-ups result from illegal trading activity by corporate insiders. It is
very hard, evenwith sophisticated econometric models, to empirically disentangle illegal trading from legal trading by
informed traders (Minenna, 2003).However, our long samplewindowenables us to exploit changes inU.S. insider trad-
ing regulations over the past decades. U.S. insider trading rules have become increasingly stringent over time. Under
the insider trading hypothesis, the decrease in target run-ups could be attributed to enhanced insider trading regula-
tions as traders increasingly fear detection and punishment. Based on a literature search, we identify four important
potential increases in the strength of insider trading rules and their enforcement over our sample period.We start our
search after 1985 as we do not have sufficient sample observations prior to that year.
A first important change in regulation occurred in 1988with the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act (Seitzinger, 2016). The Act, effective from November 19, 1988, expanded the scope of civil penalties for persons
failing to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading. It specified that investors suffering financial losses due to the
misuse of nonpublic information have the right to take legal action against insider traders, and explained that both the
leaker of inside information and the recipient of this information can be penalized. The next large regulatory change,
effective from October 23, 2000, was the Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Rules including Regulation Fair
6 Since our baseline sample only includes completed deals, we use an extended sample that includes 2,274 deals identified as “Withdrawn” in Thomson ONE
to estimate the deal completion probability. It is worth noting that the percentage of withdrawn deals (out of the total number of announcedM&A deals) has
not increased over time.
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Disclosure (Reg FD).7 This regulation states that when an issuer or representative reveals nonpublic information to
third parties, such as analysts or shareholders, the information must simultaneously be disclosed publicly. Gintschel
and Markov (2004) document Reg FD’s effectiveness in reducing the incremental information in analysts’ informa-
tion output. A third important change to the regulation was the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act effective from August
14, 2003. While SOX was not primarily intended to reduce illegal information leaks, it may have indirectly had this
effect by requiring executives to be more accountable for the information disclosed by their firms (Brigida &Madura,
2012). The SOX Act also increased penalties associated with insider trading. The fourth important change related to
the enforceability of insider trading regulation, which increased substantially after the appointment ofMary Schapiro
as SECChairwomanon January 27, 2009.More particularly, her appointment led to a strong upsurge in investigations,
including theGalleon insider trading case later that year, resulting in the arrest and sentencing of hedge fundmanager
Raj Rajaratnam.8
Figure 2 reports graphs in which we analyze median target run-ups only for those deals announced in 180-trading
day windows before and after the enactment of each event associated with a strengthening of insider trading rules or
the enforcement of those rules. We henceforth label these events “insider trading (IT) events.” We leave a 90-trading
day gap after each IT event so that the run-ups of postevent deals do not include pre-event trading days.We calculate
abnormal stock returns in the same way as our main run-up measure using 20-day abnormal stock returns obtained
through market model regressions ending on the trading day prior to the deal announcement. The median 20-day
preannouncement target run-up for deals announced during the 180-day period prior to the first IT event (Novem-
ber 19, 1988) is 11.61%. The median target run-up falls to 8.36% for deals announced in the period ranging from
trading days 90 up to 270 after the enactment of that first regulation. Similarly, median target run-ups around the
second IT event (October 23, 2000) declined from 5.81% for deals announced in the 180 days before to 4.49% for
deals announced in the 180 days after the enactment of the regulation. Following the third IT event (August 14, 2003),
median run-ups declined from3.71% to 1.52%. The fourth graph illustrates a very highmedian run-up prior to the Jan-
uary 27, 2009, IT event (9.43%) dropping down to 0.90% after the event. Median run-ups on a yearly basis (not shown
for parsimony) confirm that target run-ups tend to be abnormally high in the year 2009. One potential explanation is
that the Global Financial Crisis may have led to stronger insider trading on private knowledge about upcoming M&A
deals in an attempt to compensate for losses occurring on other (legal) trades during that period.
Together, these graphs suggest that events associated with more stringent insider trading rules tend to be associ-
atedwith declines in target run-ups. To examine this conjecturemore formally, we reestimate themodel in Column (5)
of Table 3, adding dummy variables capturing each of the four IT events. Each IT event dummy variable has a value of
zero before the relevant event and one afterward. Accordingly, the coefficients on the dummy variables represent the
change in run-ups relative to the prior period. Table 3, Column (6) reports the findings. All four dummyvariables obtain
a negative coefficient in line with target run-ups being lower after the IT events. The reduction is statistically signif-
icant for IT event 2 and IT event 3 corresponding to Reg FD and SOX, respectively. Most importantly, the time trend
coefficient is no longer statistically significant following the introduction of the IT event dummies. In other words, no
time trend in target run-ups remains in the periods in between the regulation changes. Thus, our results are in linewith
insider trading regulation as an explanation for the decline in target run-ups. The findings regarding the impact of deal
anticipation proxies on run-ups remain similar to those in previous columns.
In a further test, we quantify the component of the run-ups that is not attributable to changes in deal- and firm-
specific characteristics. This analysis serves to obtain better insight into the magnitude of the target run-up decline
unexplained by deal anticipation proxies. In linewith Custódio et al. (2013), we first estimate the regression in Table 3,
Column (1), over a window ranging from January 1, 1985 (the start of our research period), until October 22, 2000.
7 We focus on the dates on which the regulations became effective, rather than when they were announced, as the former dates should be most relevant for
insider traders.
8 We obtain the insider trading reducing events by compiling information from the following academic and business sources: Newkirk and Robertson (1998),
Steinberg (2003), Hohenstein (2006), Thompson (2013), Ventoruzzo (2015), Seitzinger (2016), and Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready (2017).
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F IGURE 2 Median target stock run-ups for deals immediately before and after insider trading reducing events
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note. This figure reports themedian target stock run-ups forM&A deals announced before and after the enactment
of four events associated withmore stringent insider trading rules in the United States. The sample consists of
2,816M&As involving U.S. bidder and target firms from 1985 to 2018 obtained from ThomsonONE.We leave a 90
trading day gap after each event so that the run-up period for postevent deals does not include preevent trading days.
Days represent trading days relative to theM&A announcement date are retrieved from ThomsonONE. The vertical
line highlights day−1. Abnormal stock returns are estimated withmarket model regressions.We estimate these
regressions over a period of 190 days ending on day−76 relative to the announcement date.We use the CRSP
equally weighted index as a proxy for themarket portfolio.
We stop right beforeOctober 23, 2000 as this day coincides with the first IT event with a significant impact in Table 3,
and we want to use an estimation period that is relatively clean of key changes in insider trading rules.9 The results
of this regression are highly similar to those for the full sample in Table 3, Column (1). We use the coefficients of this
regression to predict the run-ups for a holdout sample consisting of the remaining deals taking place from October
23, 2000, until the end of 2018. We then compute how actual run-ups over the period 2000-2018 differ from those
9 Restricting the estimation period from1985 to the trading day before the enactment of the first IT event in 1988 substantially reduces the size of the sample
that can be used (to 99 observations), but leads to qualitatively similar results.
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TABLE 4 Predicted run-up and deviations from actual run-up by year
Year Actual Predicted Actual –Predicted t-statistic N
2001 4.899 9.368 –4.470 –3.387*** 113
2002 5.787 9.949 –4.162 –2.275** 55
2003 4.673 9.707 –5.033 –4.088*** 99
2004 4.222 9.416 –5.194 –5.212*** 99
2005 3.136 9.592 –6.456 –6.473*** 81
2006 3.915 9.123 –5.209 –4.993*** 89
2007 1.867 9.512 –7.645 –7.286*** 93
2008 8.300 10.015 –1.715 –0.713 47
2009 4.379 8.653 –4.275 –2.185** 51
2010 4.396 10.322 –5.926 –3.388*** 63
2011 4.629 9.295 –4.666 –2.777*** 47
2012 3.336 10.559 –7.224 –5.493*** 58
2013 1.573 9.104 –7.531 –8.108*** 65
2014 2.522 9.604 –7.083 –6.051*** 67
2015 6.963 9.253 –2.289 –1.783* 80
2016 2.197 9.336 –7.139 –5.467*** 63
2017 3.319 8.764 –5.446 –4.038*** 55
2018 3.345 8.126 –4.781 –4.447*** 70
Note. This table reports the differences between the actual and the predicted average target run-ups. We calculate tar-
get run-ups as abnormal stock returns over trading days −20 to −1 relative to the M&A announcement date retrieved
from Thomson ONE. Predicted values are obtained using the coefficients of the explanatory variables for the sample period
from 01/01/1985-10/22/2000. The total sample consists of 2,279 M&As involving U.S. bidder target firms from 1985-2018
obtained from ThomsonONE. The Appendix provides the variable definitions. t-statistics are for the differences between the
actual and predicted average target run-ups. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively.N denotes the number of observations.
predicted by the model. The difference between actual and predicted run-ups measures the change in run-ups that
cannot be attributed to changes in the deal and target characteristics. As reported in Table 4, predicted average run-
ups are higher than actual run-ups in all years. Except for 2008 and 2015, the difference is always statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level or lower. The results are similar when we calculate median run-ups instead. The predicted
run-ups do not decrease over time suggesting that changes in deal- and firm-related determinants cannot account for
the decline in actual target run-ups.
5 ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
The relation between changes in insider trading regulation and changes in target run-ups could be spurious. This sec-
tion provides additional tests that link U.S. insider trading regulations to U.S. target run-ups.
Table 5 provides more evidence regarding the relation between insider trading regulation and target run-ups by
zooming in on a limited set of deals made either shortly before or after an IT event. The setup is similar to the analysis
reported in Figure 2 that also restricted the analysis toM&Adeals announced in narrowwindows before and after the
enactment of the four IT events. The key independent variable of interest, IT event, is equal to one for deals announced
in the window [+90, +270] following one of the four IT events and zero for deals announced in the 180 trading days
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TABLE 5 OLS regression of target run-ups in narrowwindows around IT events
Variables (1) (2) (3)
IT event –2.661* 6.234 5.454
(–1.664) (1.274) (1.092)
Number of target advisors 1.316 5.687** 5.856*
(0.656) (1.996) (1.827)
IT event×Number of target advisors –7.463* –6.759*
(–1.901) (–1.689)
Rumor 6.257**
(2.453)
Toehold 3.992
(1.075)
Cash financing 0.016
(0.768)
Hostile –16.579**
(–2.132)
Poison pill 8.458
(0.838)
Number of bidders 2.311
(0.817)
Market-to-book –0.748
(–1.434)
FCF –20.755**
(–2.336)
Dividend yield –26.025
(–0.550)
Sales growth 0.001
(0.019)
GRmismatch –0.850
(–0.416)
Leverage 0.590
(0.495)
Liquidity 3.805
(1.180)
Firm size –1.085*
(–1.735)
Historical stock return 9.931
(0.871)
State 0.024
(0.015)
(Continues)
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Private bidder 1.115
(0.282)
Target-bidder ratio –2.264***
(–3.187)
Constant 14.200*** 9.461** 18.442**
(4.291) (2.390) (2.527)
R2 0.053 0.067 0.216
IT event fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 306 306 306
Note. This table reports the estimates of the OLS regressions of target run-ups for M&A deals announced in narrowwindows
before and after the enactment of four events associatedwithmore stringent insider trading rules in theU.S. (IT events). These
deals are retrieved froma larger sample consisting ofM&As involvingU.S. bidder and target firms from1985 to 2018obtained
from ThomsonONE.We calculate target run-ups as abnormal stock returns over trading days−20 to−1 relative to theM&A
announcement date retrieved fromThomsonONE. The key variable of interest, IT event, is equal to one for deals announced in
the window [+90,+270] following one of the four IT events, and zero for deals announced in the 180 trading days before one
of the IT events. Other independent variables are explained in the Appendix. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. N denotes the number
of observations.
preceding one of the IT events. In total, the analysis includes 306 deals. We perform an OLS regression analysis and
include IT event fixed effects to examine post- to preregulation changes in target run-ups for a given regulation (i.e.,
to verify how the IT event dummy variable affects target run-ups while keeping the overall level of the run-ups around
the regulations fixed). InColumn (1), the IT eventdummyvariable has a negative coefficient. This suggests that declines
in target run-ups are indeed associated with insider trading reducing events corroborating the graphical evidence in
Figure 2.
The regression analysis allowsus to further link IT events to target run-upsbyexploiting cross-sectional differences
in the probability of insider trading. If the reduction in target run-ups is indeed caused by reduced insider trading due
to stricter regulations, the effect of insider trading regulation should bemorepronounced for takeover targets that are
more susceptible to insider information leakage. As Dai et al. (2017) argue, information leakage should be positively
associated with the number of external parties involved in the deal. Following these authors, we use the number of
financial advisors of the target firm (Number of target advisors) to capture cross-sectional differences in the probability
of insider trading across target firms. In Column (2), we interact this measure with the IT event dummy variable. The
coefficient on the interaction term is negative, consistent with the expectation that IT events should have a stronger
effect on run-ups for targetsmore prone to be affected by insider trading.10 Column (3) indicates that this result holds
while including deal- and firm-specific variables used in the baseline regression. Because these results are hard to
explain by omitted variables unrelated to insider trading, they again suggest that declines in target run-ups link to IT
events.
Brennan et al. (2018) find a strong increase in target shareholders’ conditional probability of informed trading
shortly beforeM&A announcements. The insider trading hypothesis suggests we should observe a reduction in target
shareholders’ probability of informed trading following events associatedwith increased insider trading regulation. An
M&A announcement should be good news for target shareholders, as it typically implies they will receive a takeover
premium in the near future (Song &Walkling, 2000). Thus, we focus on the probabilities of informed trading on good
10 We acknowledge that there is a strong correlation between Number of target advisors and deal size (Pearson’s correlation of 0.29). However, the results in
Table 5 continue to hold for subsamples split into large and small deals based onmedian deal size.
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news (PINgood) inferred from buying transactions. We obtain daily PINgood values for the period 1990–2014 from
Brennan et al. (2018) who base their calculations on an earlier model of Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996).
In total, there are 633 firms in our sample for whichwe have both PINgood information, as well all of the required inde-
pendent variables available. Table 6 replicates the baseline analysis in Table 3 using average PINgood values calculated
over trading days−20 to−1 relative to the announcement date, instead of target run-ups, as the dependent variable.
Column (1) reports a decreasing trend in premerger PINgood consistent with our earlier findings for target run-ups.
Column (2) adds deal and firm characteristics as explanatory variables. Most importantly, we find that the negative
trend in premerger PINgood persists after including these control variables. Column (3) includes the four IT event dum-
mies. Consistentwith our baseline results based on target run-ups in Table 3, their inclusion renders the Trend variable
insignificant. With respect to the individual IT event dummy variables, we find that IT event 3 and IT event 4 have a
significant negative impact. Unlike the baseline results in Table 3, IT event 2 does not have a significant impact. We
note, however, that the sample that can be used for the analysis in Table 6 is considerably smaller than that used for
our baseline regressions (633 compared with 2,279 observations). We have particularly low coverage of deals in the
early sample years thatmay account for the drop in significance for IT event 2.Overall, the target shareholders’ PINgood
analysis generates results consistent with our conjecture that target run-up declines are driven by a strengthening of
insider trading regulation.
In a further additional test, we focus on the role of takeover premiums. Under the deal anticipation hypothesis,
target run-ups reflect changes in the anticipated likelihood of a deal multiplied by the anticipated takeover premium
(Betton et al., 2014; Schwert, 1996). The finding of declining run-ups may arise from a decrease in the magnitude
of takeover premiums over time. This interpretation predicts a similar direction for any trend in target run-ups and
announcement effects as both should be positively affected by the magnitude of the premium. In contrast with this
prediction, as noted earlier, Table 1notes an increasing trend in target announcement returns over the research period
with target run-ups and target announcement returns having a significantly negative pairwise correlation (−0.13). To
investigate the role of takeover premiums more formally, Table 7 reports the evolution of takeover premiums mea-
sured as the ratio of the offer price to the target’s stock price one week before the announcement over the research
period. The number of observations that we can use for this analysis (2,163 in total) is slightly lower than those in
our main sample due to some missing takeover premium data in Thomson ONE. Consistent with a premium-related
interpretation for the decline in target run-ups, we find a significant negative time trend in takeover premiums over
the entire sample period. Average premiums are 42.97% in the 1985-1989 interval, reach aminimumof 31.65% in the
2005-2009 interval, and then increase again to 32.83% in the final 2010-2018 subperiod. Median premiums exhibit a
similar trend.
In a next step, we replicate the baseline target run-up regression analyses reported inColumns (5) and (6) of Table 3
with the takeoverpremium (Premium) as anadditional control variable.Wereport the results of this augmented regres-
sion analysis in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8.Most importantly, Column (1) indicates that the negative trend in target
run-ups persists after controlling for Premium. Thus, the decrease in takeover premiums over our research period can-
not explain the decline in target run-ups. Furthermore, similar to our baseline analysis, Column (2) reports that the
significant time trend in target run-ups only disappears after controlling for IT events. Overall, our findings do not
support that the decline in target run-ups arises from decreasing takeover premiums over time.
Also in Table 8, we replicate the baseline target run-up analysis without Target-bidder ratio as control variable. This
allows us to use a larger sample of 2,816 M&A deals since Target-bidder ratio is not available for most deals with pri-
vately held bidders.We find that the results are robust to using this larger sample.
Subsequently, we run a placebo test assessing the impact of U.S. IT events on Canadian M&A target firms. These
firms provide a suitable counterfactual for U.S. target firms due to important similarities in Canadian and U.S. institu-
tional settings (deBodt, Cousin,&Roll, 2017;King, 2009) drivenby a common legal ancestry (Buckley, 1997).However,
insider trading rules and their enforcement are more lax in Canada when compared with U.S. rules (Bris, 2005). If the
negative impact of the IT event dummy variables on U.S. target run-ups is indeed due to stronger insider trading mit-
igation in the United States, then we do not expect these dummy variables to be significant in a Canadian context.
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TABLE 6 OLS regression of target shareholders’ probability of informed trading on good news (PINgood)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Trend –0.008*** –0.009*** 0.004
(–6.214) (–5.662) (0.886)
Rumor 0.025 0.024
(1.199) (1.146)
Toehold –0.043 –0.018
(–1.028) (–0.435)
Cash financing –0.000 –0.000
(–0.699) (–1.160)
Hostile –0.028 –0.027
(–0.484) (–0.487)
Poison pill 0.193*** 0.197***
(2.615) (2.760)
Number of bidders –0.003 –0.005
(–0.072) (–0.136)
Market-to-book 0.010** 0.008
(2.031) (1.619)
FCF –0.038 –0.019
(–0.474) (–0.240)
Dividend yield –0.400 –0.226
(–0.951) (–0.539)
Sales growth 0.001* 0.001
(1.822) (1.377)
GRmismatch –0.023 –0.021
(–1.159) (–1.081)
Leverage –0.023** –0.022**
(–2.108) (–2.090)
Liquidity –0.047 –0.037
(–1.222) (–0.966)
Firm size 0.034*** 0.033***
(5.683) (5.722)
Historical stock return –0.046 0.050
(–0.383) (0.387)
State 0.005 0.010
(0.324) (0.611)
Private bidder 0.055 0.053
(1.414) (1.336)
Target-bidder ratio –0.009 –0.010
(–1.416) (–1.468)
(Continues)
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
IT event 2 (10/23/2000) –0.027
(–0.799)
IT event 3 (08/14/2003) –0.063*
(–1.762)
IT event 4 (01/27/2009) –0.127***
(–3.402)
Constant 0.386*** 0.175*** 0.029
(16.051) (2.772) (0.349)
R2 0.049 0.153 0.171
Year fixed effects No No No
N 633 633 633
Note. This table reports the estimates of the OLS regressions of target shareholders’ probability of informed trading on good
news (PINgood) on deal- and firm-specific explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the average target PINgood over
trading days−20 to−1 relative to theM&Aannouncement date (with the announcement date retrieved fromThomsonONE).
We obtain daily probabilities of informed trading on good news from Brennan et al. (2018). The data set runs from 1990 to
2014. The Appendix provides the variable definitions. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.N denotes the number of observations.
TABLE 7 Takeover premiums over time
Premium
Year Mean Median N
1985-1989 42.965 36.860 100
1990-1994 45.356 39.300 132
1995-1999 37.272 32.820 561
2000-2004 34.135 28.910 470
2005-2009 31.645 26.620 351
2010-2018 32.834 28.710 549
1985-2018 35.308 30.320 2,163
Trend –0.438 –0.439
p-value 0.000 0.000
Note. This table reports themean andmedian takeover premiums over six subperiods. The sample consists ofM&As involving
U.S. bidder and target firms from 1985 to 2018 obtained from ThomsonONE.We define Premium as the price paid per target
share relative to the target’s share price measured one week prior to the announcement of the deal. We retrieve premium
information from Thomson ONE.We regress premiummeasures on a yearly time trend variable and an intercept. We report
the coefficient and p-value of the time trend in the last two rows of this table.N denotes the number of observations.
Conversely, if omitted variables cause the negative impact of the IT event dummy variables, then these dummies may
also be significant in a Canadian context. We obtain a sample of Canadian M&A deals from Thomson ONE and clean
the sample using similar criteria to those outlined for theU.S. deals.Webegin the analysis in 1990due to a lack of deals
in the 1980s.Our final CanadianM&Asample consists of 751dealswith an average 20-day target abnormal stock run-
up of approximately 7.83%. Table 9 provides the placebo test results. The dependent variable is the target abnormal
stock run-up calculated over trading days−20 to−1 before the deal announcement date.
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TABLE 8 Robustness of OLS regression of target run-ups
Deal anticipation Insider trading Deal anticipation Insider trading
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Trend –0.240*** 0.125 –0.258*** 0.072
(–7.029) (1.050) (–8.431) (0.667)
Premium 0.038*** 0.034***
(3.209) (2.830)
Rumor 4.649*** 4.610*** 4.335*** 4.238***
(5.544) (5.508) (5.465) (5.369)
Toehold –1.204 –0.910 –0.979 –0.965
(–0.845) (–0.630) (–0.840) (–0.826)
Cash financing 0.009 0.013* 0.013** 0.018***
(1.282) (1.821) (1.977) (2.598)
Hostile –0.436 –0.661 –0.541 –0.908
(–0.215) (–0.329) (–0.318) (–0.537)
Poison pill –0.956 –0.456 –0.723 –0.249
(–0.286) (–0.130) (–0.226) (–0.076)
Number of bidders –0.363 –0.150 1.784* 1.982**
(–0.360) (–0.149) (1.833) (2.031)
Market-to-book 0.056 –0.019 –0.130 –0.181
(0.317) (–0.111) (–0.808) (–1.125)
FCF –5.865** –5.666** –6.027** –5.872**
(–2.038) (–1.997) (–2.386) (–2.351)
Dividend yield –9.778 –8.394 –13.733 –12.246
(–0.590) (–0.509) (–0.953) (–0.851)
Sales growth 0.000 –0.006 0.002 –0.004
(0.013) (–0.343) (0.129) (–0.261)
GRmismatch 0.071 0.197 –0.327 –0.193
(0.095) (0.264) (–0.492) (–0.291)
Leverage –0.027 0.142 0.376 0.535
(–0.070) (0.362) (1.058) (1.510)
Liquidity 0.120 0.639 –0.831 –0.436
(0.103) (0.546) (–0.813) (–0.424)
Firm size –0.678*** –0.621*** –0.808*** –0.740***
(–3.168) (–2.887) (–4.287) (–3.906)
Historical stock return –7.556** –3.671 –3.498 –0.070
(–1.973) (–0.903) (–1.013) (–0.019)
State 0.309 0.274 0.637 0.602
(0.532) (0.473) (1.213) (1.146)
Private bidder 1.372 1.570 –1.084 –0.931
(0.915) (1.034) (–1.443) (–1.243)
(Continues)
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
Deal anticipation Insider trading Deal anticipation Insider trading
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Target-bidder ratio –0.565** –0.617***
(–2.416) (–2.657)
IT event 1 (11/19/1988) –1.445 –1.404
(–0.712) (–0.852)
IT event 2 (10/23/2000) –2.962** –2.561**
(–2.370) (–2.172)
IT event 3 (08/14/2003) –2.804** –3.415***
(–2.483) (–3.148)
IT event 4 (01/27/2009) –1.521 –0.561
(–1.225) (–0.507)
Constant 14.356*** 11.998*** 12.967*** 10.650***
(6.672) (4.391) (7.038) (4.804)
R2 0.061 0.070 0.051 0.061
Year fixed effects No No No No
N 2,163 2,163 2,816 2,816
Note. This table reports further robustness tests for theOLS regressions of the target run-ups reported in Table 3. The sample
consists ofM&As involving U.S. bidder and target firms from 1985 to 2018 obtained from ThomsonONE.We calculate target
run-ups as abnormal stock returns over trading days−20 to−1 relative to theM&Aannouncement date retrieved fromThom-
son ONE. In Columns (1) and (2), we add the takeover premium (Premium). In Columns (3) and (4), we omit Target-bidder ratio
enabling us to use a larger sample of 2,816 M&A deals. The Appendix provides the variable definitions. t-statistics, based on
robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively.N denotes the number of observations.
Column (1) only includes a time trendvariable,which is insignificant. Thus, unlike in theUnitedStates,wedonot find
that Canadian target stock run-ups are declining over time. In Column (2), we include the same deal-specific variables
as for U.S. deals.11 Again, we find no significant time trend. The Target-bidder ratio has a negative impact on target run-
ups similar to the U.S. findings. In Column (3), we add a dummy variable capturing an event that potentially strength-
ened insider trading rules in Canada. In particular, on January 30, 2003, Canadian authorities responded to the lack of
enforcement of insider trading rules by proposing a national framework for securities regulation and by introducing
Bill C-46 that provided specific Criminal Code offences in relation to insider trading and substantially increased the
penalties (Canadian Securities Administrators [CSA], 2003). IntegratedMarket Enforcement Teams were established
around the same period (King, 2009). We find a negative effect of these changes on Canadian target run-ups with the
overall Trend nowhaving a positive, but nonsignificant coefficient. In Column (4), we addU.S. IT event dummyvariables
capturing insider tradingmitigation events in theUnited States after 1990 that serve as our placebo variables.We find
that theU.S. IT event dummies do not have a significant negative impact on Canadian target run-ups. However, IT event
4 has a significant positive impact. Overall, this placebo test suggests that the negative impact of IT event dummies in a
U.S. context is not spurious.
In an untabulated test, we verify whether the decline in target run-ups reflects a shift in shareholder value cre-
ation from target to bidding firms. We calculate run-ups and announcement returns for the publicly held bidders in
the sample using a similar methodology to the one used for calculating the measures displayed in Table 1. We do not
11 Controlling for target-specific characteristics would unfortunately make the analysis of Canadian firms unfeasible due to too large loss of observations.
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TABLE 9 OLS regression of Canadian target run-ups
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Trend –0.082 –0.102 0.266 –0.288
(–0.620) (–0.765) (1.619) (–0.890)
Rumor 5.107 3.878 2.393
(0.628) (0.440) (0.280)
Toehold 0.686 0.642 0.399
(0.285) (0.268) (0.165)
Cash financing –0.007 –0.010 –0.011
(–0.412) (–0.586) (–0.630)
Hostile –5.049 –5.798 –5.713
(–1.375) (–1.581) (–1.507)
Poison pill 0.679 2.589 2.410
(0.115) (0.446) (0.401)
Number of bidders 2.135 1.203 1.252
(0.602) (0.337) (0.348)
Private bidder 5.605 6.714 6.048
(0.820) (0.985) (0.953)
Target-bidder ratio –1.667*** –1.618*** –1.626***
(–3.432) (–3.344) (–3.352)
IT event Canada (01/30/2003) –9.815*** –9.785*
(–3.513) (–1.882)
IT event 2 (10/23/2000) 6.167
(1.338)
IT event 3 (08/14/2003) –0.328
(–0.071)
IT event 4 (01/27/2009) 5.642**
(2.112)
Constant 9.395*** 12.562** 15.197*** 17.144***
(3.689) (2.547) (3.025) (2.847)
R2 0.001 0.021 0.036 0.044
Year fixed effects No No No No
N 751 751 751 751
Note. This table reports the estimates of the OLS regressions of target firms’ stock run-ups on deal-specific explanatory vari-
ables. The sample consists of M&As involving Canadian bidder and target firms from 1985 to 2018. We calculate target run-
ups as abnormal stock returns over trading days−20 to−1 relative to theM&A announcement date retrieved from Thomson
ONE. IT event dummyvariables represent events associatedwith stricter insider trading regulation in aCanadian andU.S. con-
text. The Appendix provides the variable definitions. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.N denotes the number of observations.
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find evidence of substantial bidder run-ups over the sample period (i.e., average of −0.22%, median of −0.14%). We
also find no significant time trend in bidder run-up measures over the sample period. The p-value of the annual time
trend coefficient obtained for the bidder run-up measured from trading day −20 to −1 is 0.81. This suggests that the
decrease in target run-ups does not arise from a shift in the distribution of (anticipated) takeover gains from targets
toward bidders. Finally, we do not find a significant trend in bidder announcement returns over the research period.
The p-value of the annual time trend coefficient obtained for bidder announcement stock returns is 0.189.
In another unreported test, we replicate the baseline regressions in Table 3 using insider purchases filed in accor-
dancewith Section16(a) of theSecurities andExchangeAct of 1934, obtained fromThomsonFinancial InsiderTrading,
as the dependent variable (Cline, Gokkaya, & Liu, 2017; Foucault & Fresard, 2014). It is important to note that these
data only capture self-reported trades from corporate insiders, such asmanagerial executives.We do not find a signif-
icant impact of the four IT event dummy variables on these “legal” insider purchases, which is not surprising as the IT
events reflect regulatory attempts at reducing illegal trading activity. Also unsurprisingly, the negative trend in target
run-ups persists when controlling for these registered insider purchases.
Several studies document evidence in line with informed trading activity in the option markets (Augustin, Brenner,
& Subrahmanyam, 2019; Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998;Mayhew, Sarin, & Shastri, 1995). Thus, we reflected upon
the possibility that the reduction in target run-ups may have resulted from a shift in insider trading activity from the
stock to option markets. We believe this scenario is unlikely for the following two reasons. First, a move from stock
to option markets in response to IT events would be based on the assumption that insider trading is less likely to be
penalized in the option markets than in the stock markets. Academic and anecdotal evidence is inconsistent with this
conjecture (Chakravarty, Gulen, & Mayhew, 2004). In addition, even if a large number of insider trades would move
from the stock to option markets following IT events, the effects of these option market trades would also be felt in
the stockmarket due towell-established links between bothmarkets (Hu, 2018; Stephan&Whaley, 1990). Therefore,
option market trades in target firm shares are likely to translate into target stock run-ups anyway, albeit potentially
with short delays.
6 CONCLUSION
M&A target run-ups are well-established examples of preannouncement stock price patterns. The literature provides
robust evidence that target firms exhibit a stock price increase in the period prior to the deal announcement (Dennis
&McConnell, 1986; Dodd, 1980; Keown& Pinkerton, 1981;Meulbroek, 1992; Schwert, 1996).
In this paper, we report that this stylized fact has dramatically diminished over time. In our sample of U.S. domestic
M&As from 1985 to 2018, we find average target run-ups of 9.71% during the last half of the 1980s, similar to pre-
vious studies. However, average run-ups declined to 8.33% by the last half of the 1990s and continued to diminish
during the 21st century. In the last subperiod of our research window, 2010-2018, average target run-ups are as low
as 3.75% with a median of 2.18%. In contrast, we observe that announcement period target abnormal stock returns
increase over time resulting in a relatively constant magnitude of overall target stock returns associated with M&A
announcements. In other words, our findings show that, over time, a smaller proportion of the target abnormal stock
returns materialize prior to the announcement date and a larger proportion occurs around the announcement date.
The decline in target run-ups over time could potentially be attributed to a reduced ability of investors to antici-
pate M&A deals or to a decline in illegal insider trading activity in the market. Using a range of deal- and firm-specific
proxies suggested in previous studies, we do not find evidence that the deal anticipation explanation can account for
the decline in target run-ups, although we cannot completely rule out this explanation with the tests available. Con-
sistent with an insider trading explanation, we find that the trend disappears when controlling for events likely asso-
ciated with a reduction in the intensity of preannouncement insider trading. We conduct a wide range of robustness
tests, including a placebo analysis on Canadian firms, to address concerns that our baseline results are a product of a
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spurious association between target run-ups and insider-trading–reducing events. Reassuringly, these tests all cor-
roborate that a reduction in insider trading is themost likely explanation for the lower target run-ups.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
This Appendix presents the variables used in the empirical analysis (in alphabetical order) and describes their con-
struction. All days represent trading days.We obtain balance sheet data fromCompustat, stock price data fromCSRP,
and deal-specific information from Thomson ONE. All balance sheet items are measured at the fiscal year end before
the deal announcement date (obtained from ThomsonONE) unless noted otherwise.
Variable Definition
1990-1994 An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/01/1990 and
zero otherwise.
1995-1999 An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/01/1995 and
zero otherwise.
2000-2004 An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/01/2000 and
zero otherwise.
2005-2009 An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/01/2005 and
zero otherwise.
2010-2018 An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/01/2010 and
zero otherwise.
Cash financing The natural logarithm of one plus the percentage of the deal value paid in cash. The
corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is “Consideration: Percentage of Cash.”
Dividend yield Dividend yield of the target.
FCF Free cash flow over total assets of the target.
Firm size Total assets of the target converted into constant 2010U.S. dollars using the U.S. Consumer
Price Index obtained from theOECD.
GRmismatch An indicator variable that takes a value of one for targets with combinations of above average
growth, below average liquidity, and above average leverage, or below average growth, above
average liquidity, and below average leverage and zero otherwise.
Historical stock
return
Average daily excess returns of the target over the four years preceding the announcement
using the S&P 500 as themarket index.
Hostile An indicator variable taking a value of one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise. The
corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is “Deal Started as Unsolicited Flag (Y/N).”
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Variable Definition
IT event 1
(11/19/1988)
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 11/19/1988 and
zero otherwise.
IT event 2
(10/23/2000)
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 10/23/2000, and
zero otherwise.
IT event 3
(08/14/2003)
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 08/14/2003 and
zero otherwise.
IT event 4
(01/27/2009)
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/27/2009 and
zero otherwise.
IT event Canada
(01/30/2003)
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the deal was announced after 01/30/2003 and
zero otherwise.
IT event An indicator variable that takes a value of one for deals announced in the window [+90,+270]
following one of the four IT events and zero for deals announced in the 180 trading days
before any of the IT events.
Leverage Average leverage ratio of the target over the three years prior to the announcement date.
Liquidity Average liquidity ratio of the target over the three years prior to the announcement date.
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio of common equity of the target.
Number of bidders The number of bidders involved in the deal. The corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is
“Number of Bidders.”
Number of target
advisors
The number of target firm financial advisors involved in the deal. The corresponding data item
from ThomsonONE is “Number of Target Advisors.”
PINgood Average daily posterior (conditional) probability of informed trading on good news (“informed
buying”) in the target firm’s stock calculated over trading days−20 to−1 relative to the
announcement date. Daily probabilities are calculated as in Brennan et al. (2018).
Poison pill An indicator variable taking a value of one if the target has a poison pill approved by its board
and zero otherwise. The corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is “Defensive Poison
Pill Flag (Y/N).”
Private bidder An indicator variable taking a value of one if the bidder is a private company and zero otherwise.
The corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is “Acq Public Status.”
Premium The ratio of the offer price to the target stock pricemeasured oneweek prior to the deal
announcement. The corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is “Offer Price to Target
Stock Price Premium 1Week Prior.”
Rumor An indicator variable taking a value of one if there is a takeover rumor pertaining to the deal
before the announcement date and zero otherwise. The corresponding data item from
ThomsonONE is “Deal Began as Rumor.”
Sales growth Average growth (percentage change) in target firm sales over the three years prior to the
announcement date.
State An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the target’s state of incorporation is Delaware
and zero otherwise.We obtain this information fromCompustat.
Target-bidder ratio The natural logarithm of the ratio of the target’s market capitalization to the bidder’s assets
value. For publicly held bidders, we obtain total assets from ThomsonONE. For privately held
bidders, we obtain total assets from ThomsonONE and Capital IQ (for Canadian bidders, we
only use ThomsonONE).
Toehold An indicator variable taking a value of one if the bidder owns target shares as of the
announcement date and zero otherwise. The corresponding data item from ThomsonONE is
“Percent of Shares Held at Announcement.”
Trend Announcement year of the deal minus 1985 (the first year of the sample period).
